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REVIEW ESSAYS
Tribe's Judicious Feminism
Professor Anita L. Allen*
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES.
York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc.
I.

1990.

By Laurence H . Tribe.

242 pp.

INTRODUCTION

The title of Professor Laurence Tribe's recent book,

ofA bsolutes,

New

$1 9.95.

A bortion: The Clash

brings to mind the din and fury of battle. However, beyond the

brash red, white, and blue book jacket, one fi nds not a battlefi eld, but a
courtroom of quiet reason.

The Harvard scholar's serene assessment of

abortion rights promises to illuminate for a wide audience both why the de
mands of pro-choice feminists are not constitutionally extreme and why the
purported policy compromises initiated by pro-life forces fail to qualify as
compr omises at all.

Indeed, Tribe's j udicious defense of the liberal pro

choice perspective has already found favor in surprising quarters. Journalist
Nat Hentoff , the self-described "atheist civil-libertarian pro-lifer, " praises
Tribe's pres entation of the right to privacy as unusually "lucid. " 1
The "absolutes" Tribe refers to are the strongly held belief in a woman's
right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy, and the equally strong
belief in a fetus's right to l ife. Professor Tribe's optimistic central thesis is
that the clash between these absolutes is not an insurmountable obstacle to
compromise: that the abortion issue need not produce irreconcilable conflict
between groups favoring women's rights on the one hand and those favor ing
fetal rights on the other. Acknowledging the development of seemingly ab
solute values on abortion in contemporary America, Tribe maintains that
"[f]ar from being inevitable outgrowths of the natural order of things, these
c ompeting values are socially constructed . "2 He concludes that understand
ing the social origins of these competing values paves the way for genuine
compromise.
The image of th e abortion issue as a clash of absolutes is apt in many
r espects, whether one views the values at stake as natural and immutable or,
with T ribe, as socially constructed. The aptness of Tribe's image is strongly
$
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suggested by at least a quarter century of public discussion and scholarly
inquiry about abortion which centered on the "right to privacy" and the
"right to life." But the image of the abortion issue as a clash of absolutes is
also potentially misleading. Whether a woman's right to privacy ought to
outweigh a fetus's ri ght to life is but one normative question abortion poli cy
raises.

Tribe's unidimensional metaphor fails to capture other important

questions that the abortion debate brings to mind. 3

Yet Tribe's profile of

abortion policy is no mere sketch of a major public controversy. Details of
history and constitutional theory make his study admirably complete.
My goals here are first to convey the thrust of Tribe's perspective, and
second to briefly evaluate Tribe's argu ments for abortion privacy and against
fetal personhood. Arguing with special clarity, Tribe d efends the constitu
tional privacy doctrine and its application to abortion laws on grounds tha t
will sound familiar t o the legal academy. Revealing his considerable femi
nism, Tribe's appeals to constitutional equal protection doctrines and to t he
history of gender roles to justify liberal abortion laws are more refreshing.
Falling only somewhat short when he attempts to defend claims that a wo
man's right to choose is fundamental to constitutionally protected liberty,
Tribe's critical response to claims made on behalf of t he fetus f all s furt her
from the mark.
II.
A.

WOMEN'S RIGHT T O PRIVACY

Privacy Losing Ground
Quite apart from the abortion issue, the idea of a fundamental right to

priv acy is losing ground. Its demise was foretol d w hen, in

wick,

Bowers v. Hard

the fundamental privacy right failed to protect sexual intimacy b e

-

3. Since the 1970s, academic philosophers with an interest in abortion law have focused on
questions relating to whether the unborn are persons, whether the unborn have a right to life, and
whether women's liberty, privacy, equality, or bodily integrity justify autonomous abortion choices.
See, e.g., THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABORTION (Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel & Thomas
Scanlon eds., 1 974). They have also focused on whether parenthood or parenting obligations coun
termand abortion and whether just governments may impose or limit childbearing. See, e.g.. Sara
Ann Ketchum, The Moral Status of the Bodies of Persons, 1 0 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 25 (1984);
Steven L. Ross, The Death of the Fetus. II PHIL & Pus. AFF . 232 ( 1 9 82); Roger Wertheimer,
Understanding the Abortion Argument, I PHIL & Pus. AFF. 67 ( 1 97 1 ); Mark R. Wicclair, The
Abortion Controversy and the Claim That This Body is Mine, 7 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 337 (i 981 ).
The requirements of virtue ethics, an ethic of care, and of moral decisionmaking-in-context have
captured the attention of some philosophers interested in abortion, including some feminist philoso
phers. See, e.g., Kathryn Pyne Adde!son, Moral Passages, in WOM EN AND MORAL THEORY 87 (Eva
Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1 987); Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Theory and Abortion, 20
PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 223 ( 1 99 1 ). Some have recently begun to raise questions about the varied mean
ings diverse ethnic groups attach to pregnancy and abortion.
At the same time, lawyers have focused primarily on questions of constitutional interpretation
and adjudication, "fundamental" rights, federalism, the public/private distinction, the role of reli
gion and morality in constitutional law, anonymous recordkeeping, the legal status of the fetus,
equal protection for women and the unborn, public funding of poor women's abortions, regulating
prenatal conduct, and the rights of minors. For a recent bibliography of such !ega! writi!1g, see
AN ITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PR I VACY FOR WOMEN JN A FREE SOCIETY, 199 n. l6, 200 nn.
28-30, 201 nn.32-33, 202 nn. 5 2 & 54, 203 nn.60-61 (19S8).

No vember

TRIBE'S JUDICIO US FEMINISM

1 991]

tween consenting adults.4 The Supreme C ourt in

Bowers

181

upheld a Georgia

criminal statute under which a man was charged after police discovered him
engaging in homosexual sodomy in his o wn home.
Arguably,

Bowers implied no

adverse dest iny for t he ri ght to privacy doc·

t rine; the decision merely prono unced that the Court would limit fundamen·
tal privacy protection to heterosexual intercourse, reproduction, and family
life. However, the majority opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist in

Director, Missouri Department of Health

Cruzan

v.

was more clearly a dirge. 5 In the

name of Nancy C ruzan's "privacy," Justice Rehnquist asked o nly whet her
her Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest was vio lated by t he Misso uri
Supreme C o urt 's ruling that "clear and convincing evidence" of her own
wishes must be presented in proceedings brought to terminate life sust aining
treat ment .
Why is the concept of a fundamental const itutional right to privacy--one
requiring stri ct judicial scrutiny-losing ground in the Supreme C ourt ?
Why i s the privacy argument fo r abortio n right s not holding sway wit h v ocal
segments of the general public? What is the case fo r federal constitut io nal
protection of abo rtion choice?

A bortion: The Clash of A bsolutes

is perhaps

best viewed as a respected scholar's response to just these questions.
Earl y in his book, Professor Tribe traces the evolution o f women' s consti·
tutional right to aborti on fro m

Health Ser vices.7

Roe

T ribe explains how,

Webster v. Reproductive
after pronouncing in Roe t hat w o men

v.

Wade6

to

have a "fundamental" right t o decide whet her to have an abortion, the
Court initially " issued a series o f opinions both reaffirming the rules of Roe
and . . . applying them to specific cases."8 Yet, Tribe notes, a dramatic
change in t he composition of the Court in the

1 980s winnowed t he 7·2 Roe
1 989 Webster decision pro·

majority to a narrow 5· 4 margin. The Court's
duced only "four solid votes to reaffirm

Roe,"

aft er which "the tenuous na·

t ure of the constitutio nal right to choose t o terminate a pregnancy w as
evident t o anyone who could count."9 Since the publication of Tribe's book,
the Supreme C o urt has handed down new decisions upho lding abo rtion re·
strict io ns.

The right to choose abortion has become more tenuous still.

With the ret irement of Justice Thurgood Marshall, abortion privacy is
t hreatened with imminent extinct ion.
A number of academic commentators have been deeply crit ical of the
legal ev olution Tri be soberly recounts. Reacting to

Webster,

Ro nald Dwor

kin accused the pluralit y of premising it s attack on Roe on " st unningly bad
argument . " 1 0 Indeed, one may wonder whether the Court made any a rgu4. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Cf Jed Rubenfeld, The Right iO Pri vacy 102
HARY. L. REV. 737, 746-47 (1989) (arguing that Bowers may foretoken the decline of the privacy
,

doctrine).

5. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
6.

410 U.S. !13 (1973).

7.

492 U.S. 490 (1989).

8.

P. 14.

9.

P. 20.

10.

I

Ronald Dworkin, The Future of Abortion, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Sep. 28, 1989, at 47. 47.
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ment at all in

Webster.
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The C ourt appeared to ignore the wealth of argu

ments in defense of Roe that have emerged since

1972,

rej ecting

Roe

without

explaining "what, if anything, was wrong with the decision . " 1 1
For all the build-up that it received, the

Webster

disappointment when it came to settling the fate of

case was a phenomenal

Roe,

the constitutional

privacy doctrine, and the constitutional status of the unborn. 12 Subsequent
Supreme C ourt cases have been no better. Each one validated restrictions on
abortion imposed by state or federal authorities, and yet none directly con

Roe.
In two 1 990 abortion cases, Hodgson v. Minnesota 1 3
Center for R eproductive Health, 1 4 the idea of the abortion
fronted

and

Ohio v. Akron

ri ght as fundamen

tal, and thus commanding the strict judicial scrutiny of compelling state in
terest analysis, played no role in the majority opinions. I ndeed, in

Hodgson

Justice Stevens stood with Justice O ' Connor rather than his more liberal
colleagues to uphold restrictions on abortions that do not "unduly burden"
the fundamental rights of minors. 1 5 Skirting Roe's requirement that govern
ment justify abortion restrictions on the bas!s of compelling public interests,
Justice O'Connor would have the C ourt test the constitutionality of abortion
restrictions on the basis of whether such restrictions impose an "undue bur
den" on a fundamental right. 1 6
In the

1 99 1

decision,

R ust v. Sullivan, 1 7

with abortion liberals on the Court.

Justice O'Connor partly agreed

Along with Justices Blackmun, Mar

shall, and Stevens, she declined to join a five justice maj ority in upholding
recently reinterpreted abortion restrictions promulgated by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services pursuant to Title X of the Public Health Serv
ices Act. 18 The majority held that "gag rule" regulations prohibiting the
dissemination of medical information or advice about abortion were a rea
sonable interpretation of earlier statutes prohibiting abortion-related activi
ties in family planning programs receiving federal funds. Justice Rehnquist
argued for the majority that, without abri dging constitutionally protected
free speech or due process, "government may 'make a value judgment favor
ing childbirth over abor tion, and . . . implement that judgment by the alloca
tion of public funds. ' " 1 9 Describing the majority analysis as "facile" and
"disingenuous," Justice Blackmun countered that First and Fifth Amend
ment rights of speech and privacy invalidate the Title X gag rule.20 But
Justice O'Connor's

R ust

dissent shined no ray of hope on the survival of the

I I . Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Retreat from
Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 8 3 , 84 (1 989).
12. See Anita L. Allen, Webster Marks Time, 2 BJOLAW U:l531 (Sep. /Oct. 1989).
1 3 . 1 1 0 S . Ct. 2926 (1 990).
1 4. 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1 990).
15. Hodgson, 1 1 0 S. Ct. at 2944.
16. !d. at 2949-50 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part); see also Anita L. Allen, Court Disables
Disputed Legacy of Privacy Right, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1 3, 1 990, at S8, Sl4.
1 7. I ll S. Ct. 1759 (1 991).
18. !d. at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
19. !d. at 1772 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
20. !d. at 1 77 8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

Roe

v.
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abortion privacy doctrine. She avoided premising her dissent on substantive
privacy rights protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four
teenth Amendments.

Rather, citing canons of statutory construction, she

argued that "neither the language nor the history of [the Public H ealth Ser
vice Act] compels the Secretary' s interpretation, and . . . the interpretation
raises serious First Amendment concerns . " 21

A bortion Privacy as Constitutional and Fundamental

B.

With an eye toward rehabilitating the right to choose, Professor Tribe
surveys the pro-choice argument s and analyzes the constitutional basis for a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy.
common procedural obj ections to

Roe

But first he pauses over two

( 1) that the ri ght to
(2), its corollary, that

and its progeny:

pri vacy is not in the text of the Constitution, and

legislators, not judges, should decide the abortion question.
Reacting to the former objection, Tribe emphatically disputes the con
servatives' view, shared by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
White, that the Due Process Clauses provide only procedural protection
against the deprivation of liberty. 22 Tribe points out that a long line of
Supreme Court decisions has held that the protection of "liberty" contained
in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has the effect of apply
ing the Bill of Rights (the text of which refers only to the federal govern
ment) with equal force to the states.

Since the Bill of Rights undeniably

contemplates substantive rights, "the claim that the liberty clause is ' en
tirely' procedural is unsustainable. " 23 Thus, the issue for Tribe becomes
whether the meaning of "liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment is lim
ited to the protections specifically listed in the Bill of Rights.
The answer to this question seems obvious to Tribe: The Constitution
was not intended to be, and has never been interpreted as being, a compre
hensive list of the rights of the people-" [T]he Supreme Court has consist
ently recognized that in adopting the Constitution the people did

not

mean

to place the bulk of their hard- won liberty in the hands of government save
only for those ri ghts specifically mentioned. " 24 Consequently, the fact that
the word "pri vacy" does not appear in the Constitution does not preclude
judicial recognition of a constitutional right to privacy.
As for the latter objection, that legislators represent the people, and
th erefore they , not judges, should resolve the abortion issue, Tribe concedes

Roe may be
whole point of an
that

antidemocratic. But he convincingly counters that " [t]he
independent judiciary is to be 'antidemocratic, ' to preserve

21. Jd. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
22. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507 (1989) ("[T]he Due Process
Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be neces
sary to secure life, libeny, or propeny interests of which the government itself may not deprive the
individual."

(quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs.,

(1989))).
23. P. 8 7 .
24. P. 90.

489 U.S. 189, 196
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from transi ent maj orities those human rights and other princi ples t o which
our legal and political system is commi tted. " 25 Thus , i f there is a constitu
ti onal right to abortion, Tribe argues, it i s the Supreme Court's duty to be
antidemocratic by striking down any state l egislation that violates that
ri ght. 26
As one might expect, a direct substa ntive defense of the jurisprudence of

Roe

is an important step in Tribe's overall analysi s . H e argues that a wo

man's right to an aborti on i s grounded in the constituti onal ri ght to p rivacy,
and that i t is a fundamental right, which states may restrict only with the
most compelling justifications.
Reci ting pertinent history, Tribe notes that

Skinner

v.

Oklahoma27

was

the first case in which the Supreme Court applied the fundamental ri ght of
privacy to reproduction. There, the Court struck down an Oklahoma stat
ute prescribing the forced steri li zation of certain criminals , recognizing what
Tribe calls "the grotesque disempowerment that could occur if the choice of
whether to beget a child were transferred from the indi vi duai to the state . " 28
Later, i n

Griswold

v.

Connecticut

29 and i n

Eisenstadt

v.

Baird, 30

the Court

struck down state statutes restricting the use of contraceptives. According
to Tribe, " [w]hat i s really protected as a fundamental ri ght i n the contracep
tion cases is the right to engage in sexual intercourse without having a
chi ld . " 31

Since aborti on implicates thi s very right, and since forcing a wo

man to undergo the rigors and possible stigma of unwanted pregnancy and
childbirth is an even greater personal invasion than regulation of contr acep
ti ves, i t seems fair to say that a woman's right to termi nate her pregnancy is
fundamental.
In classifying a woman's ri ght to choose abortion as "fundamental,"

Tribe r efers to the Court's "long traditi on of asking first about the right that
is asserted, to see whether it is a fundamental liberty, and only

then

turning

to the r easons, such as protection of the fetus's ri ght to life, that might none
theless j usti fy that liberty's abridgment. " 32 By thus challenging the perspec
tive that the e ff ect of abortion on the fetus must be considered in the very
formulation of women's right to abortion pri vacy, T ribe takes on two of the
Supreme Court's most ardent foes of Roe. Justices Scalia and White defin e

women's liberty in the abortion context in just this way, contemplating that
the ri ght to kill a fetus cannot plausibly be considered fundamental. 33
25. P. 80.
26. See also Ronald Dworkin, The Reagan Revolution and the Suprem:: Court, N.Y. REV.
BooKs, July 18, 1 99 1 , at 23, 23 (book review) ("America's principal contribution to political theory
is a conception of democracy according to which the protection of individual rights is a precondi
tion, not a compromise, of that form of government.").
27. 3 1 6 U.S. 535 (1942).
2 8 . P. 93.
29. 3 8 1 U.S. 4 79 ( 1 965).
30. 405 U.S. 438 ( 1 972).
3 1 . P. 94.
32. P. 96.
33. P. 97 (referring to Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 1 10, i24

November 1 99 1)
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Tr ibe states that this approach, appl ied across the board, "woul d do vio
lence to all our rights. " 34 For exampl e, the state's power of militar y con
s cr iption, w hich obviousl y impairs fundamental l iberties, is available only
under compell ing circumstances. The state may not, f or example, d raft its
citizens merely to act as chauffeurs f or public officials. However, Tr ibe ar
gues that under the Scalia and White approach a citizen's right not to be
made a chauffeur woul d be defined as the right to inhibit effi cient chauffeur
s ervice for publ ic officials, which no one regards as a fundamental right. " If
we incorporat e the state's reason f or its regul ation into the initial definition
of the l iberty," Trib e writes, "the f undamental nature of that l iber ty inevita

bly vanishes."35 Perhaps the fundamental character of sexual autonomy van
ished in Bowers because the Court quickl y embraced moral tradition as a
"reason" f or r egul ating homosexual ity. The better approach in the abortion
context is fi r st to deter mine whether the woman's interest in terminating her
p regnancy is a f undamental right, and then to consider whether the state has
a compelling interest in restricting it.
The question of fundamental ity should drive courts toward an assess
ment of how val uable the l iberty-whether to choose abortion or to choose
homosexual intimacy-is to the overall liberty of the right-h ol der. Persuad
ing non-bel ievers that pri vate abort ion choices are a fundamental liberty is
crucial f or the l iberal cause. Prof essor Tr ibe does a fine job, as others have
done, 36 of countering the ar gument that the right to privacy l acks a textual
basis. H e al so does a good job of formulating the practical and conceptual
links between abortion rights and constitutional liberty for women.
Less adeq uate is his account of the pr actical and conceptual links among
constitutional liberty, abortion rights, and privacy. It is in expl aining what
privacy-in its several senses-has to do with constitutional liberty and

abortion rights that Tribe's discussion f alls somewhat short. This deficiency
is significant. Robert Bork, f or exampl e, has argued not only that the gen

eral right to privacy is not contained in the text of the Constitution, but also
that he cannot grasp the purported conceptual link between that right and
abort ion. 37

To get a grip on th e connections among constitutional liber ty, abor tion
rights, and privacy, it is useful to consider the inter ests of individual s that
are threatened wh en governments attempt to curtail abor ti on choices. 3 8 I n

TiVhalen v. Roe, t he Supreme Court i n effect noted three main "privacy" in
t en�sts am enabl e to legal protection: ( 1) an interest in autonomous decisi on
m aking ,

(2) an

interest in confidentiality, and (3) an interest in ph ysical

n.4 (! 989) (plurality opir.ion), and Justice White's dissenting opinion in Th ornburg h v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792 n.2 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)).
34. P. 97.
35.

P. 98.

36.

See. e.g., D,WlD A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTiTUTION 231-81 (1986).

37. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF A M E RICA: THE POLITIC.">L SEDUCTION OF
LAW 97, 11!-16 (1990).
38. See A. ALLEN, supra note 3; Anita L. Allen, Taking Liberties: PriYacy, Private Choice, and
Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 461 (1987).
THE
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seclusio n. 39 Privacy in all three of these impo rtant senses i s a t stake in the
choice of competing abo rtio n po licies.
At issue pri marily is the interest of all women in making choices abo ut
reproduction that are not mandated by go vernment. Autonomous choices,
free of the controlling interference of public officials, are "private" choices.
To believe in the right to privacy, we need not believe that nature divides
so cial life literally into public and private realms.40 We can coherently de
scribe the condition of being relatively free of the mo st direct, consequential,
and commonly offensive go vernmental interference as our "privacy. " In this
sense of the term, "privacy" connotes autonomy, liberty, freedom, and the
peace of mind which stems from the independent exercise of one's own
judgment.4 1
Restrictive state regulation of abo rtion threatens a second "privacy" in
terest: the co nfidentiality o f the physician-patient relationshi p . This fo rm of
privacy calls fo r a strong presumptio n in favor of confidenti al record keeping
and anonymous public reporting.

A third "privacy" interest touched by

restrictive abortion laws is the interest in physical seclusio n . 42 This interest
is at once an interest in restricting access to one's body and restricting access
to o ne's ho me or other physical retreat. Fo r example, many forms of physi
cal co ntact actionable as battery or trespass in tort law interfere with the
interest in seclusion. Crowded acco mmodations--o r intimacy and responsi 
bility within spacious o nes-also interfere with seclusion . Typical American
homes are a secure retreat from strangers, but whether a person's ho me is
also a shelter from unwanted contact with intimates depends upo n vari ables
such as family size and responsibilities. For most people in o ur so ciety, wo 
men especially, the responsibilities of parenting small children cut deeply
into o pportunities fo r privacy. The ability to contro l repro duction is there
fo re an important precondition of privacy at ho me.
Abo rtion cases fro m Roe through Thornburgh v. American College of Ob
stetricians and Gynecologists43 repeatedly emphasized the i m po rtance of au
to nomous decisio nmaking.
Thornburgh emphasized bo th auto nomous
decisio nmaking and confidentiality.44 No co urt has no ted the distinct pri
vacy implications of childbearing on the traditional under standing of the
home as a peaceful retreat, however Justice Blackmun' s opinion in

Roe

bro ach ed wi tho ut appro val the no tion that the Consti tutio n mi ght protect
39. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 & n.24 ( 1 977).
40. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-78 ( 1 9 5 8 ); cf. Howard B. Radest,
The Public and the Private: An American Fairy Tale, 89 ETHICS 280 ( 1 979) (arguing that room for
privacy might be found in the interaction between polity and community).
4 1 . Cf. Joseph Kupfer, Privacy, Autonomy and Self-Concept, 24 AM. PHIL. Q. 8 1 , 82 ( 1 987)
("[P]rivacy is essential to the development and maintenance of an autonomous self.. . . [A]utonomy
... includes a concept of oneself as a purposeful, self-determining, responsible agent.").
42. I explore this less familiar argument for abortion rights in Uneasy Access. A. ALLEN, supra
note 3, at 54-8 1 .
43. 476 U.S. 747 ( 1 986).
44. The Court invalidated state data-collection requirements that would place otherwise confi
dential information about individual abortion patients into the hands of public authorities, condemn
ing these requirements as unconstitutional indirect constraints on abortion rights guaranteed in Roe.
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bodily integri ty.

He expressly rejected the argument of certai n

amici

that

cri minal abortion statutes should be constituti onally invalidated on grounds
of interference wi th women's bodi ly integrity. Then, in one of the most con
fusing passages in

Roe,

he suggested that as pregnancy progresses a woman

"cannot be isolated. " 4 5 Because a woman and her fetus functi on as a bi olog
ical unit, Justice Blackmun inferred that government has grounds under the
constitution for limi ti ng her autonomy.
The inference here, that women who lack privacy i n the sense of physical
seclusion therefore lack pri vacy in the sense of autonomous deci si onmaki ng,
fallaci ously confl.ates two disti nct senses of "privacy. "
Blackmun's characterization of pregnant women as

M oreover, Justi ce

ipso facto

not "isolated"

problematically assumes that the unborn are the metaphysical and moral
equi valents of persons for purposes of describing condi tions of privacy. To
treat the unborn as relevant for purposes of the discourse of physical seclu
sion, even though they do not watch and listen in ways that give rise to
modesty and shame, requires an argument.
Justi ce Blackmun's opinion in

Roe

was not successful in setting out the

conceptual connection between privacy and abortion. 46 He failed to distin
guish carefully the physical privacy of seclusi on from the decisional privacy
of liberty or autonomous choice. One might ascribe a similar failure to Jus
tice D ouglas. His majority opinion in

Griswold

did not carefully distinguish

the physical privacy of a marital bedroom unpoliced by law enforcement
agents from the decisional privacy of liberty to seek, purchase, and use con
tracepti on. 47 Justice D ouglas's potentially confusing appeal to the concept
of privacy, combined with hi s vague assertion that the right to privacy sub

sists in the penumbra of the Constitution's express provisions, cast a regret
table shadow over the Cour t's fi rst announcement of fundamental privacy
protecti on.
These admi tted inadequacies were never a sign that a jurispruden ce of
fundamental privacy was inherently untenable. Indeed, the str ai ghtforward
jurisprudence of pri vacy elaborated in

Roe's

progeny is n ot wei ghed down by

the ambi guity and met aphor that marred the earliest eff orts.

Thornburgh

cites the textual liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of sub
stantive fundamental rights, concluding that havi ng a choice about whether
to bring a child into the worl d numbers among the constitutionally protected
fundamental liberties.48

In fact, the argument of

Thornburgh

is that few

liberti es are more cri tical to the lives of young women than the ability pri
vately to choose whether to bear chi ldren. Rights protecti ng sexual au ton
omy, contraceptive choice, and abortion choice are therefore key resources
for women.
It is notew orth y that the J ustices who have cast their v otes in favor of

I

45.

Roe, 410 U.S. at !59.

46.

See Allen, supra

47.

Griswold

48.

Thornburgh, 476 U.S.

v.

note

38,

at

468.

Connectic,Jt, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).

at 772.
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upholding abortion restrictions have not expressly grappled with what the
dissent in Webster termed the "
inevitable and brutal consequences" of anti
abortion laws.49 Approximately 1.5 million preteen, tee age, and adult o
?
�
men obtain abortions each ye ar. 50 Abortion was exceedmgly common pnor

to Roe, when as many as 330,000 illegal abortions were performed each
year. 51 Legislated limitations on abortion will most severely affect poor wo
men. To severely affect impoverished Americans is to severely affect blacks
and Hispanics, who are disproportionately poor. At present, 43.2 percent of

black women with children under 18 live in poverty.52
Children, even wanted children, impose special burdens on the poor.
School-aged girls and working women lack adequate daycare and welfare
assistance for their children.

While some pregnant women can count on

adoption to provide homes for unwanted children, adoption is not an attrac
tive option for women whose black, ill, or handicapped children would likely
not be placed in adoptive homes. Ideally, the Supreme Court would refrain
from cementing unworkable, sentimental ideals of family life into constitu
tional law. Yet the Supreme Court has often done just that, to the detriment
of the least advantaged. The Court has upheld the constitutionality of legis
lation banning state and federal medicaid funding for elective abortion and
prohibiting doctors in federally funded family planning clinics from men

Rust,53 Web
Roe51 legitimate

tioning abortion as an option for their patients. Decisions like

ster,54 Harris

v.

McRae,55 Poelker

v.

Doe,56

and

Maher

v.

the imposition of maternity on lower income women.
If state and federal governments ultimately succeed in erecting prohibi
tive barriers to abortion, as several have already done, the number of self
induced and unlicensed abortions may rise to alarming pre-Roe levels.
was not surprising that, as anxieties about the overturning of
fever pitch prior to the

Webster

Roe

It

reached

decision, a California group disseminated a

video about a do-it-yourself abortion technique they called "menstrual
extraction. "58
These evocative social concerns bear directly on the constitutional rights
of women. They are the context for answering the question, posed by consti49.

Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 558 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concur

ring in part and dissenting in part).
50.

The figure is widely cited. See, e.g., Phillip Elmer-DeWitt, A Bitter Pill to Swallow: Birth

51.

Russell S. Fisher, Criminal Abortion, in ABORTION IN AMERICA 3, 6 (Harold Rosen ed.,

Control in the U.S. is Out of Date�nd Getting More So, TIME, Feb. 26, 1990, at 44, 44.
1967) (rev. ed. of THERAPEUTIC ABORTION (1954)).
52.

David H. Swinton, The Economic Status of African Americans: "Permanent" Poverty and

Inequality, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 199!, at 25, 43 (Janet Dewart ed., 1991) (summariz
ing government statistics).
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

I ll S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
492 U.S. 490 (1989).

448 u.s. 297 (1980).

432 U.S. 519 (1977).

432 U.S. 464 (1977).

No GOING BACK: A PRO-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (The Federation of Feminist Women's

Health Center 1989) (on file with author). This 28-minute film is available from the producers in
Los Angeles.
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tutional courts themselves, of h o w deeply liberty i s touched b y aborti on re
stricti ons.
rather

Liberty is so deeply affected that thousands of women would

ri sk infertili ty

or

death

in

unskilled

hands

than

carry

their

pregnancies to term .
Tribe's sympathetic expli cati on o f the jurisprudence o f

Roe

potentially

reassures reader s that there is a defensible constitutional argument for abor
ti on ri ghts. But the ar gument Tribe defends has proven to be controvertible.
One kind of critic admits that the right to pri vacy i s fundamental and that
aborti on i s conceptually and practically li nked wi th pri vacy, but fails-even
after all the social evi dence is in-to be persuaded that aborti on ri ghts are
import ant enough to the experi ence of pri vacy to warrant consti tuti onal pro
tection. Indeed, the fact that abortion ri ghts are not explicitly protected i n
the Consti tution and are not universally demanded strikes some a s evi dence
that anti-aborti on statutes must not be a consti tutionally significant imposi

'

l

tion on a fundamental ri ght.

l

J

Uncongenial to any "fundamental" concepti on of privacy rights, Chi ef
Justice Rehnquist and Justi ce Whi te maintain that the argument for treating
abortion rights as fundamental i s particularly weak. 59 Closely reading the
r elevant precedents, they deny that aborti on ri ghts are deeply rooted in the
history and tradi ti on of the nati on. 60 They deny, too, that abortion rights
ar e essential to the concept of ordered liberty. 6 1 Because they beli eve abor
ti on fails these constitutional tests, they conclude that aborti on pri vacy is not
a fundamental right under the Fourt eenth Amendment.

Tribe's indirect answer to these arguments is a hi storical survey of the
roo ts of b oth the "pro-li fe " and " pro-choi ce" movements in thi s country
from the Ameri can Revolution to the present. Tribe str esses an observation
mentioned by Justice Blackmun in

Roe.

Abortion was l egal and not uncom

mon in 1ate ei ght eenth and early ni neteenth century Ameri ca. 6 2 Because
chi ldren wer e reg arded as economic assets to western frontier families, wo
men who sought aborti ons were pri marily single women.

Therefore, any

n egative connotati ons attached to abortion stemmed not from pro- life senti
ments, bu t from the view that premarital sex was i mmoral. 63
However, abor ti on at this ti me was by no means as safe a procedure as i t
i s today-Tribe ci tes a
59.

30

percent death rate for all surgi cal abortions i n

See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. a t 785-814 (1986) (White, J., joined b y Rehnquist, C.J., dissent

ing). But cf Justice Powell's opinion in Moore v.City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(plurality opinion) ("Constitution protects the sanctity of the family because the institution ...is
deeply rooted in [U.S.] history and tradition.").

60.

Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 793-94 (White, J., dissenting); cf Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.

319, 325-26

( 1937)

(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Clause incorporates only those

rights that are essential to ordered liberty).
61.

Thornbu.;-gh, 476 U.S. at 790-94 (White, J., dissenting). But cf ivfoore, 436 U.S. at 499-504

62.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 138; pp. 28-29; see a/so DEBORAH L.RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX

& n.O
I (plurality opinion) (arguing that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be
limited by arbitrary line drawing).
DlSCRJMINATION AND THE LAW 202-07 (1989).
63.

p 29.

"
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early nineteenth century New York. 64 Thus safety concerns soon led to the
first statutory regulation of abortion, passed in Connecticut in 182 1. The
Connecticut statute did not prohibit all abortions, but only those induced
through the use of dangerous poisons.

Fetal protection, Tribe concludes,

was not the statute's goal. The genesis of the movement to restrict abortion
in the United States "was neither religious belief nor a popular moral cru
sade." 65 On the contrary, the movement was the product of an organized
lobbying effort by the medical profession in the mid-nineteenth century.
The doctors were spurred by two concerns. First, for both safety and
business reasons, they wished to eliminate the performance of abortions by
irregular physicians and by apothecaries promising miracle abortion tech
niques. Second, the notion that the fetus is a human life gained increasing
acceptance throughout the medical profession. An elite profession with an
increasingly technical appreciation of inner anatomy, they drew moral con
clusions from the physiological fact that the unborn come to possess dis
tinctly human traits many weeks prior to delivery from the womb.

To

advance their views, physicians organized a national lobbying effort, using
arguments designed to strike a responsive chord in the hearts of the people.
These included assertions that abortion is murder, which infl u enced the
powerful Catholic Church, and that abortion poses a threat to traditional sex
roles by enabling women to escape their duty as childbearers.66

In time, the efforts of the medical profession "altered the prevailing atti
tudes about the practice [of abortion] in the United States . "67 By the turn of
the century, more than forty states had passed statutes restricting abortion

to instances when it was necessary to save the life of the woman.68 Accord
ing to Tribe, a movement to reform the strict abortion laws began in the
1 9 50s. Women's groups began to call for the repeal of restrictive laws, but
by 1 973, when

Roe

was adjudicated, only four states had guaranteed women

the right to terminate their own pregnancies. Tribe concludes that, had the
Supreme Court not intervened in

Roe

by invalidating anti-abortion statutes,

most states would not have repealed their restrictive laws.69

Tribe states that the true motivation for abortion restrictions appears to
stem not from a belief that the fetus is a person, but from the desire to rein
force the traditional role of women as virtuous childbearers.70 In defense of
this contention, Tribe points out that abortion is the "only .. . place in the
law where a really significant and intimate sacrifice has been required of
anyone in order to save another."7 1 Because abortion restrictions bur den
only women, "a ban [on abortion] places women, by accident of their biol64.

65.
66.

67.
68.
69.
70.

34.

71.

Id.

p 30.
Pp. 30-34.
P. 30.
p 34.
Pp. 35-51.

His discussion of the rape or incest exception most clearly illustrates this point. Pp. 233-

p 131.
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ogy, in a permanently and irrevocably subordinate position to men. "72
While abortion opponents generally favor allowing the procedure in
cases of rape or incest, they would prohibit abortion in cases of simple con
traceptive failure. According to Tribe, this inconsistency suggests that the
key to the antiabortion view is not the voluntary nature of the pregnancy,
but the voluntary nature of the sexual conduct. Thus, it appears that "such
antiabortion views are driven less by the innocence of the fetus . . . than by
the supposed 'guilt' of the woman."73 Antiabortion statutes are, therefore,
attempts to "impose virtue" on women. Further societal disrespect of wo
men's judgment is reflected in statutory requirements that would hamper
women in choosing abortions. For example, waiting periods imply "an as
sumption that a woman making this decision is misguided and is likely to be
acting rashly."74 Thus, as Tribe maintains and as many feminists have ar
gued, abortion restrictions are merely manifestations of broader societal
views about the roles and capacities of women.
C.

The Equal Protection A lternative
Professor Tribe's endorsement of an equal protection rationale for abor

tion rights is partly responsive to the concerns of feminists like Catharine
MacKinnon and Deborah Rhode, who believe that a privacy jurisprudence
fails to capture women's full stake in the abortion question. 75 Although the
Supreme Court's Fourteenth Amendment analysis in

Roe

relied solely on the

Liberty Clause, Tribe believes the Equal Protection Clause in the same
amendment also substantiates the right to abortion. Given that the

Skinner

Court recognized a fundamental right to control one's own reproduction,
and given that laws restricting abortion negatively affect only women's
lives, 76 Tribe believes that such laws "place a real and substantial burden on
women's abiliiy to participate in society as equals. "77
Tribe does well to see equal protection analysis as an additional argu
ment, rather than as a substitute for the privacy-based rationale for abortion
rights.

Many feminists argue that privacy jurisprudence fails to fully pro

mote, and may actually harm, women's interests.

Feminism Unmodified,

Catharine MacKinnon's

which rejects the privacy rationale, may be viewed in

72. P. 1 32.
73. !d.
74. p 1 37.
75. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
96- 1 02 ( 1 987); D. RHODE, supra note 62. Feminist attacks on the idea of privacy for women began
in the nineteenth century. In Women and Economics, Charlotte Perkins (Stetson) Gilman "decon
structed" the idea of domestic privacy, demonstrating that middle class homes are not seats of mean
ingful privacy, especially for married women with children. CHAR LOTTE PER KINS GILMAN,
WOMEN AND ECONOMICS 248-69 (Carl N. Degler ed., Harper & Row 1 966) ( 1 898).
76. Restrictive abortion laws sometimes negatively affect men's lives too. From an economic
point of view, for example, unwanted children are burdens for their fathers. Although men have
financial responsibility for their children, this burden is both indirect and not of the same character
as the burden on women. !t does not, therefore, eliminate the equal protection argument.
77. p 105.

. jl
l
'
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this vein. 7 8

While her argument reveals some of Roe's shortcomings,

MacKinnon understates the positive influence

Roe

has had in the quest for

women's equality.
The real problem is not with the right to privacy as such, but that women
have had too much of the wrong kinds of privacy.79 The "wrong" kind
that which MacKinnon emphasizes in her attack on Roe-is the "privacy"
of the domestic sphere, where a dominant man controls sex and home life.
The "right" kind of privacy, which MacKinnon disregards, gives women
real choices. Privacy can enable some women to escape unhappy and op
pressive lives, and others to experience the peace of mind conducive to their
making contributions both inside and outside the domestic sphere.

Other

feminists reject privacy arguments for abortion because the concept of pri
vacy presupposes liberal individualism, a concept they rej ect as incompatible
with women's identities as interconnected, social beings. 80 Since virtually all
cultures value privacy in some form or other, it is not persuasive to argue
that privacy

is contrary to

women's natures or

inherently

anticom

munitarian. Women writers like Emily Dickinson and May Sarton, who did
not marry or have children and who deliberately worked in seclusion, illus
trate that sweeping rejections of all forms of privacy as "male" and "liberal"
are untenable. 8 1
Despite the checkered history o f the concept o f privacy i n the Western
world and the failure of privacy arguments to be completely persuasive in
practice, abandoning privacy arguments in favor of an exclusive reliance on
equal protection arguments is not the answer. To be sure, equal protection
analysis avoids the "substantive due process" quagmire of the privacy-as
fundamental-liberty argument.

Yet it does so only at significant cost.

Viewed solely as a matter of equal protection, women's reproductive aspira
tions must be framed in public legal discourse on the model of men's lives.
Viewed as a matter of privacy, abortion rights clearly entail equality, and yet
women are better able to assert that the autonomy they seek reflects their
own experiences, rather than being the strict analogue of the autonomy men
enJoy.
It may be possible to make a case for abortion rights that does not ex
pressly refer to privacy. 8 2 However, I conj ecture that most American wo
men would be unable to articulate fully their concerns about anti-abortion
laws without appealing to notions of privacy. In talking about abortion, wo
men commonly say that government should mind its own business. By us
ing the term "privacy" in connection with abortion, women are able to draw
78.

C.

79.

This is the theme of Uneasy Access.

MAcKINNON, supra note 75.
A. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 70-72.

80. Robin West has argued that the experiences of menstruation, heterosexual intercourse,

pregnancy, and breast feeding make the liberal model of the separate, individual person i napplicable
to women. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender,

8 1 . See
82.

55

U. CHI. L. REV. 1

( 1 988).

A. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 78-79.

For example, a recent 28-minute pro-choice advocacy film delicately evaded rhe expression

"privacy, " in an effort to deflect criticism. No GOING BAC K : A PRO-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE, supra
note

58.
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on a wealth of shared meanings, including connotations of autonomy, inde
pendence, and respect for others. Tribe wisely refuses to jettison privacy's
rich semantic heritage when he embraces an equal protection analysis to sup
port a woman's right to choose.
III.

FETAL PERSONHOOD

I have set forth in some detail the kind of case Tribe makes for character
izing abortion choice as a fundamental right. Tribe insists that doing justice
vis-a-vis women's fundamental rights requires that particularly strong,
"compelling" reasons be adduced if the constraint of abortion choices is to
be constitutionally permissible.
Doubtless the most cited putatively compelling reasons to constrain
abortion choices refer to the interests of the unborn or the state's interests in
the unborn. Have the unborn, in fact, interests that government may weigh?
Does government have independent interests in the unborn that it may
weigh? Privacy arguments for choice fail to persuade those who believe that
the conceptus, embryo, fetus or unborn child (here, collectively, the "fetus")
is of paramount moral concern.
Despite the importance of autonomous decisionmaking for women, some
believe that the human life developing
moral quality.

in utero

is invested with a special

Christopher Stone calls this quality "considerateness." 8 3

Others have labelled it "personhood," "potential personhood," "humanity, "
or "potential humanity. " I will call this quality personhood, although few
would say that the traits of self-conscious, rational, moral agency usually
associated with personhood exist in a fully realized form in the unborn. Still,
it is this quality that some see as making the state's interest in fetal life mor
ally compelling.
The argument that it is morally wrong for a woman to procure an abor
tion because of the unborn's personhood passes over the value of the wo
man's own personhood. There are

two

quantities of personhood at stake in

the context of abortion : that of the woman and that of the fetus. Both enti
ties are invested with human potential, but to different degrees. 84 The con
siderable, but nonetheless inchoate potential of the unborn life is in
competition with the more tangible potential of the pregnant woman. This
"squaring off" of human potential in the moral debates about abortion
seems unavoidable.
Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous pro-choice argument premises abortion
rights on the notion that women have a property interest in their bodies that
is at least as strong as the inconsistent property interest the unborn have in
theirs. 8 5 Women have a right, therefore, to rid themselves of, as it were, a
trespassing fetus. Thomson's understanding of the implications of property
83.

CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURAL·

ISM, 43-62, 7 3 - 8 3 ( 1 987).

84. Allen, supra note 3 8,
85.

at 485-86.

Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of A bortion, I PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 47, 48- 49 ( 1 97 1 ).
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rights and related rights of bodily integrity is arguably severe. Yet, taking a
different tack, it can be argued that our society has good reason for prefer
ring the potential of the woman over that of the unborn.
Preferring adult women is a way of rewarding the effort and self-disci
pline that virtually every adult must bring to the conduct of his or her life.
It is also a way of respecting plans and ambitions that may be inconsistent
with pregnancy or parenting. It is, finally, a way of acknowledging the spe
cial risks of pregnancy to health and wellbeing, and the value, to each person
who can consciously choose, of being able to control such risks. Except per
haps in a grossly underpopulated community, these considerations favor pre
ferring the potential of the pregnant woman to that of the fetus. P rofessor
Tribe does not, as I do, baldly state that society should prefer women's po
tential to that of their fetuses. However, he does plainly imply an overvalua
tion of the fetus and an untenable undervaluation of women.
As interesting as this sort of moral reflection on the subject of abortion is,
it does not directly address what could be the critical legal issue: the consti
tutional status of the human fetus. Fetuses may be moral persons and yet
fail to be legal, constitutional persons.
Tribe maintains that, by stating in

Roe

that the fetus was not a person,

the Supreme Court "needlessly insulted and alienated those for whom the
view that the fetus is a person represents a fundamental article of faith . " 8 6
In doing so, the Court galvanized the pro-life movement and politicized the
abortion issue. Tribe suggests that, had the Court employed equal protec
tion analysis, it could have avoided this controversy while still articulating a
meaningful statement about the rights of women in America. 8 7
This intriguing thought is nevertheless misguided.

Citizens are con

cerned not just with the jurisprudential theories the Supreme Court employs,
but also with the concrete implications of its decisions.

For example, it is

doubtful that equal protection arguments against slavery would have been
more welcome to the ears of antebellum slaveholders in the Am erican So uth
than arguments against slavery premised on blacks having inalienable, com
mercial privacy rights over their own persons.
Although he seems to think the Court could have avoided it, Tribe him
self takes up the question of the constitutional status of the unborn.

He

concludes that the fetus cannot be considered a "person" under the Consti
tution. If it were, abortion would be the legal equivalent of murder. Tribe
maintains that treating abortion as murder runs counter to the entire history
of Anglo-American law. 88 Furthermore, no abortions, not even in the case
of rape or incest, would be j ustified if abortion were considered murder.
Even some birth control methods, such as the IUD (intrauterine device) and

RU- 486
86.

(the

contragestational

"abortion

pill"

recently

developed

in

P. 1 3 5 .

8 7 . Jd.
88.
murder.

Historicaily. even when abortion was criminalized in America, it was a lesser crime than

P. 1 21 .
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France), would b e instruments of murder since they prevent the fertilized
ovum from implanting in the wall of the uterus.
Some have argued that the Constitution should be interpreted as permit
ting the states to define the legal status of the fetus as they choose. Tribe
counters that this would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the central
purpose of which is "to prevent some states from adopting a narrower view
of personhood than others. "8 9 Tribe also asserts that if states were allowed
to define fetuses as persons, they might enact a variety of fetal endangerment
statutes that could "obliterate a pregnant woman's liberty and her very per
sonhood. " 90 Pregnant women could be restricted from eating and drinking
what they chose or engaging in any activity the state deemed hazardous to
the fetus's health. 9 1 Thus, Tribe argues, neither the Supreme Court nor the
states may legally recognize the fetus as a person.
Tribe's constitutional argument against fetal personhood is philosoph
ically troubling. Like many mainstream legal philosophers, he fails to give
close attention to the principles of a j urisprudence of exclusion-the reasons
courts should employ in deciding what kinds of entities matter in the law.
The legal community is presently at odds over how best to characterize
the legal status of the developing fetus. The unborn clearly matter in Ameri
can law, but there is wide disagreement concerning the weight to attach to
claims made on the basis of fetal health in the face of competing claims
about the liberty and fundamental rights of pregnant women.

On the one

hand, the Anglo-American legal tradition has never accorded the full legal
status of "person" to the unborn.

For example, the Supreme Court has

never held that they are "citizens" of the United States, entitled to the same
constitutional rights as fully born persons. On the other hand, the unborn
are taken into account in the allocation of property rights and the attribution
of criminal and civil responsibility. Property can be bequeathed to the un
born; many states make it a crime to kill a fetus; wrongful birth actions are
torts premised on injurious acts or omissions respecting the unborn.
Professor Ronald Dworkin, whose analysis of the constitutional status of
the fetus has much in common with Professor Tribe's, argues against this
same background of precedent that the best interpretation of constitutional
law is that fetuses are not persons.92 One can agree with the conclusion
Dworkin and Tribe reach without endorsing the mode of argument they em
ploy. Indeed, one strains to understand what rules, principles, standards, or
other norms a court facing a question of constitutional personhood is sup
posed to rely upon.
Both Dworkin and Tribe pose the crucial question-whether fetuses are
constitutional persons-and then give less than satisfying answers. They say
nothing to illuminate the law's j urisprudence of exclusion, and nothing to
89.

p

90.

P. 1 2 8 .

91.

1 26.

Some o f this i s already happening. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug A ddicts Who

Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy,
92.

1 04 HARV. L. REV.

1 4 1 9 ( 1 99 1 ) .

Ronald Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, N.Y. R E V . BooKs, June 2 9 , 1 9 89 , a t 4 9 , 49.
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indicate what specific principles should guide legal thinking about the consti
tutional rights of the unborn.
In keeping with his philosophy of "law as integrity," one would expect
Dworkin to view the law as containing identifiable norms of exclusion dis
cemable through constructive interpretation.9 3 Dworkin appears to follow
his own prescription for legal reasoning when, with respect to fetal per
sonhood, he argues:
The question is one of legal interpretation. The principle that the fetus is
not a constitutional person fits better with other parts of our law and also
with

our

sense of how related issues would and should be decided if they

arose than the rival principle that it is. . . . Apart from anti-abortion stat
utes, there are few signs in

our

law

of the kind of regulation of pregnancy

that would be appropriate if the fetus were a constitutional person, and the
Supreme Court has never suggested any constitutional requirement of such
protection. 94

"our

When Dworkin invokes

sense of how [fetal personhood] issues would

and should be settled, " to whose sense is he appealing? Perhaps that of the
pro-choice forces within the community, with whom he happens to agree?
The evasion of discord and ambiguity implicit in Dworkin's appeal to
"our sense" of how related issues would and should be resolved is alarming.
While often legitimate in normative argument, the appeal to moral para
digms and legal expectations becomes indefensible in

contexts where

profound disagreement exists about the very paradigms and expectations
employed.

The United States is presently undergoing a crisis concerning

appropriate public responses to abortion, prenatal injury and treatment, and
the use of fetal tissue in medicine and research, precisely because the applica
ble norms are unsettled.

Neither Tribe's nor Dworkin's interpretative ap

peal to norms implicit in the law produces persuasive results. Perhaps they
could not in areas of the law, like this one, where past political acts and their
meanings are themselves controversial.

When Dworkin writes that estab

lished law or its best interpretation clearly opposes fetal personhood, his rich
prose rings of false bravado.
Both Tribe and Dworkin argue that if one deeply probes the totality of
one's beliefs about law, it becomes clear that one does not, and cannot, be
lieve that abortion is murder and the fetus is a constitutional person. While
feminists may applaud this conclusion, the conservative, conventionalist,
and positivist nature of the inquiry-"there are few signs in our law"-is not
a distinctly "feminist" or otherwise progressive mode of analysis. Dworkin,
especially, lays out no principles to ease the mind of someone who fears that

Roe

is really

Dred Scott

for the unborn. Tribe, on the other hand, obliquely

addresses such fears by implying that those who oppose the right to choose
abortion often subscribe to a constitutionally untenable tradition that subor
dinates women.

In fact, Tribe's rendition of women's history, rather than

93. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE ( 1 986).
94. Dworkin, supra note 92, at 50 (emphasis added).
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any narrow constitutional argument, is a t the heart o f his claim against fetal
personhood. 95
Another distinction between the approaches of Tribe and Dworkin arises
out of Dworkin's claim that if a fetus is a constitutional person, then

Wade

R oe

v.

;
I

is "plainly wrong" on equal protection grounds. Knowingly killing a

person, says Dworkin, is a crime in every state.

i
J
Il

Focusing on equality be

tween pregnant women and their potential children, Dworkin does not satis
factorily answer the obvious concern about equality between women and
men. Tribe, however, stresses that women have a right to live as freely and
capably as do men. He thus avoids the trap that Dworkin falls into when his
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own requirement of "fit" conflicts with his equal protection analysis. Would
a requirement that a woman carry her pregnancy to term fit a system of laws
that otherwise eschews good samaritan duties? It seems doubtful.

If this

requirement were nevertheless imposed, how broad would the exception be?
One must ask whether the argument that mothers must make their bodies
available to their children means, for example, that the state will require of a
parent whose fatally ill child needs a liver transplant that he or she donate a
lobe to keep the child alive.
IV.

THE POLITICS OF COMPROMISE

Tribe illuminates why the privacy argument for access to medically safe
abortions is not more popular and is losing ground in the courts. He never
theless shows that the fundamental privacy and equal protection arguments
for abortion choice are better than some critics imagine. Tribe attempts to
reduce concern relating to the welfare of the unborn. However, he does not
alter the fact that, for many, the fetal personhood question is a genuine bar
rier to wholehearted acceptance of constitutional privacy protection for
abortion.

It will remain so until acceptance of the feminist version of the

history of reproductive laws overtakes concern for the fate of the unborn, or
scholars like Tribe and Dworkin devise an appropriately persuasive argu
ment for excluding, or limiting from consideration, the interests in and of the
unborn.
The abortion debate in the United States illustrates that merely recount
ing feminist histories of women and reproductive law does not automatically
convince pro-life proponents to abandon their demands for fetal protection
and take up arms for women's privacy and equality. Vigorous, secure pro
choice abortion policies will require our society to more thoroughly value
women, their j udgments, and their contributions outside the home. Such a
fundamental change in values cannot be legislated by fiat.

Ultimately, for

women's interests to be protected, the force of law must be imposed on the
unpersuaded, as it has been since

R oe

v.

Wade.

Although Tribe seems to appreciate the importance of j udicial w illin g
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95. Cf Janet Gallagher, Prenatal In vasions & Interven tions: What 's Wrong with Fetai Righ ts,
1 0 HARV. WoMEN's LJ. 9 ( 1 987) (proposing a balancing test that recognizes governmental goals

but prevents undue state intervention by valuing a woman's legal standing and bodily integriry).
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ness to stand by anti-majoritarian and unpopular constitutional principles,
he also clings to the possibility of broad public compromise. To set up his
proposals for compromise, Tribe surveys abortion law and practices in other
parts of the world and other periods of history.

He describes the eugenic

abortion policy of Nazi Germany to illustrate the evils of government over
involvement in individual choices: Under the Third Reich, a "genetically
pure" Aryan woman who had an abortion was subject to the death penalty,
while "genetically defective" women were sterilized. 96 Contemporary India,
on the other hand, symbolizes the extreme of government under-involve
ment. In India, where there is a marked religious and economic preference
for sons, the growing availability of amniocentesis has resulted in an increas
ing number of abortions for gender selection.

Predictably, the result has

been a disturbing imbalance in the male-to-female population ratio. 97
Abortion is also common in Japan, China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern
Europe. In Japan, abortion has become the primary means of birth control
due to an unusual level of fear about the safety of oral contraceptives and the
scarcity of other means of contraception . 9 8 Overpopulation in China has led
to laws that allow only one child per family; additional pregnancies are sub
ject to compulsory abortion.99

In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,

where abortion is legal and adequate contraceptives largely unavailable, as
many as four out of five pregnancies are terminated. 1 00
In most Western European countries abortion is legal, but only under
certain circumstances, such as cases of rape or incest, or when the woman's
health is endangered. Many of these countries also permit abortion where
serious economic or social hardship for the woman would result. In France,
a woman is entitled during the first ten weeks of pregnancy to judge for
herself whether the hardship requirement is satisfied. 1 0 1
Professor Mary Ann Glendon defends the Western European compro
mise-which officially permits abortion only in hardship cases, but allows
women to assess the acuteness of their own circumstances--on the ground
that it "combine[s] compassion with affirmation of life . " 1 02 Noting the ab
sence of widespread controversy over abortion in Western Europe today,
Tribe nonetheless rejects the Western European "compromise . " Contrasting
his view with Glendon's, Tribe counters that this apparent solution, "within
an Anglo-American legal system that has long insisted that law be composed
of enforceable norms, seems to teach mostly hypocrisy . . . . [It] is bound, in
the long run, to offend American conceptions of equal justice. " 1 03
Compromise, American style, must account not only for American legal
96.
97.
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expectations and ideals, but also for the realities of American politics. Tribe
maintains that R oe galvanized pro-life supporters to organize in virtually
every state election. The right-to-life movement succeeded in electing candi
dates sympathetic to its beliefs to Congress and state legislatures, but many
elected officials were reluctant to act on such a controversial issue. 1 04 By
1 984 it had become increasingly apparent that if Roe were to be overturned,
the Supreme Court would have to do it. President Reagan appointed a third
of the Court's members in his tenure. However, Tribe notes, the controversy
that arose over Reagan's nomination of Judge Robert Bork-who openly
expressed

his

belief that

no

constitutional

right

to

privacy

exists

"powerfully displayed how deeply entrenched was the belief among the
American people that there had to be such a right. " 1 05 When the Supreme
Court decided

Webster

in 1 9 89, the newly threatened pro-choice movement

raised the privacy flag whose "current popular appeal clearly depends on
keeping the question focused on

who

will make the decision . " 1 06

Webster

awakened a pro-choice movement which had been lulled into a sense of se
curity in the sixteen years since Roe.
A number of states have already failed in their efforts to block access to
abortion. For example, after

Webster

appeared to loosen lawmakers' reins,

the Florida legislature nevertheless failed to pass antiabortion statutes. The
Florida Supreme Court later declared a right to abortion under the state
constitution, independent of R oe and the Federal Constitution. 1 07 Tribe re
j ects the argument, suggested by the experience in Florida, that overturning
Roe and returning abortion to the states would have little or no impact on
women's rights. He argues that if Roe was decided correctly and the Court
properly recognized a constitutional right to abortion, this position is in
defensible. Tribe argues that "making [women] fight for their reproductive
liberty in the arena of politics, even if they do manage to win much of it
back, is wrong-both morally and under our Constitution. " 108

Women

should not have to expend time, money, and political resources vindicating a
right that already belongs to them.

Nor should they be forced to vote for

pro-choice candidates who may not otherwise share their views, simply to
gain recognition for rights they are legitimately afforded under the Constitu
tion. Tribe's normative argument is sound, but the current composition of
the Supreme Court makes it unlikely that the institution that he says ought
to continue to recognize abortion privacy under the Constitution in fact will.
The idea that abortion rights rest secure outside of the political arena cannot
be sustained in the present context.
For Tribe, any realistic version of abortion compromise in this country
must guarantee federal constitutional protection for choice. In the conclud
ing chapters of his book, Tribe analyzes proposed "compromises" that do
1 04 .
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less than this, criticizing virtually all of them as attempts by the pro-life
lobby to make abortions more difficult to obtain. Tribe then proposes what
he regards as meaningful compromises, based on better contraceptive pro
grams, childcare assistance, and new technologies. Regarding the false com
promises, Tribe argues that, "although the compromises are designed to
sound reasonable, they would sacrifice much more than they would accom
plish. " 1 09

Spousal consent requirements, for example, are relevant only

where a woman wants to have an abortion against her husband's wishes. In
such a situation, the wishes of only one party can prevail, and it is illogical to
favor those of the husband over those of the wife, since she is the one who
must bear the child. Parental consent requirements, too, operate on the as
sumption that the woman--or girl-should not make such an important de
cision on her own.

Yet, Tribe points out, this reasoning implies that the

parents would also be entitled to compel their immature daughter to have an
abortion-a provision which, of course, is found nowhere in the law. Both
spousal and parental consent requirements rob women of due autonomy.
Parental notification requirements, while seemingly less oppressive than
parental consent laws, share the unfortunate effect of compounding the
stress and anxiety of a pregnant minor. The reproductive choices of minors
are of grave concern to many families and communities and may therefore
seem to warrant paternalistic public intervention. However, as Tribe points
out, it makes no sense to impede freedom of choice by imposing parental
notification requirements that guarantee no pregnant girl meaningful paren
tal guidance, while placing some at risk of parental rejection or abuse. Thus,
Tribe explains, the consent and notification laws, which sound like good

faith attempts to foster family communication, in practice achieve little good
and may cause much harm to already distressed women. 1 1 0
Tribe takes particular exception to the abortion funding "compromise,"
which, with Supreme Court approval, restricts public support for poor wo
men's abortions. Because the Court in

R oe

focused on the "negative" con

cept of privacy, rather than the "positive" concept of equal protection, Tribe
deems it "unsurprising that the Court later held that government has no
constitutional duty to help women exercise [the right to obtain an abor
tion] . " 1 1 1 It is not clear, however, that the privacy rationale of R oe is the

true

culprit. Surely the Court could read equal protection, no less than pri

vacy, as merely a "negative" right of noninterference rather than a positive
right t.o government assistance. Tribe nonetheless correctly argues that de

nial of public funding for abortions in states where public assistance is avail
able for childbirth but not for abortion creates a situation of i nequality
respecting indigent and affi.uent women and their families. This situation of

distributive

inequity, "is really no compromise at all and seems particularly

immoral . " 1 1 2 Reproductive freedom is too important to be allowed to de1 09. P . 1 97.
1 10. Pp. 202-03.
I l l . P. 206.
1 1 2. P. 207.
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pend on so random a characteristic as the extent of a woman's wealth.
Professor Tribe thus argues that the commonly proposed compromises
are not true compromises. Nominally, they purport to accommodate both
pro-choice and pro-life viewpoints, but their real purpose is to reduce the
number of abortions performed. These supposed compromises "promise
abortion rights in principle but deny them in practice to those who are least
able to bear the burden of motherhood-particularly the young, the unedu
cated, the rural, and the nonwhite." 1 1 3 In order to achieve meaningful com
promise, both absolutes must bend. The pro-life camp must recognize the
rights of the woman, at least up to some point in pregnancy, as superseding
those of the fetus, and the pro-choice camp must acknowledge that the be
liefs of a significant sector of American society strongly disfavor unlimited
abortion rights.

The political "compromises" that Tribe regards as one

sided result from the lack of precisely this sort of bilateral concession.
In America, the most obvious starting point has been largely overlooked.
Both sides would agree that reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies is
desirable. Tribe proposes lowering the incidence of unwanted pregnancies in
two ways. First, childbirth should be made more affordable--through better
postnatal care programs, mandatory maternity and paternity leaves, subsi
dized childcare, and flexible time arrangements in the workplace.

Such

measures would somewhat alleviate the problem of pregnancies unwanted
for economic reasons. Second, sex education and safe, effective contmcep
tion should be more widely available.
This two pronged, common sense approach has not yet been adopted in
the United States. Impeding its adoption, Tribe stresses, are societal beliefs
regarding private responsibility and the role of women as childbearers. The
conservative groups generally in favor of abortion restrictions see no reason
to support expensive postnatal care and contraception programs because
they favor the traditional system, wherein women bear and raise the
children.
Tribe discusses possible technological innovations that further illustrate
his belief that outmoded stereotypes regarding women's roles are the founda
tion of restrictive abortion policy preferences. For example, development of
an artificial womb that could nurture a transplanted fetus at any point after
fertilization would seemingly satisfy the concerns of both the pro-choice and
pro-life

camps.

Women

would

not

be

forced

to

endure

unwanted

pregnancies and childbirth, and fetuses would still grow into babies. Tech
nological innovation is, however, no panacea. States that chose to ban abor
tion in reliance upon such technologies would have to bear the resulting
costs, and nurturing the fetus, caring for the infant, and rearing the resulting
children would be expensive.

Even in the unlikely event that foster care

could be found for every artificially nurtured fetus, the medical costs of such
a program would be enormous.

Thus, Tribe argues, one reason that such

technological innovation has not occurred may be that "by comparison with

1 1 3.

P. 209.
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any technological alternative, women represent cheap 'baby machines. ' '' 1 1 4
More so,

some regard women

as the only

morally appropriate

"baby

machines."
A significant weakness in Tribe's analysis is his assumption that artificial
womb technology would satisfy the concerns of all sides.

Constitutional

scholars have not adequately grappled with the possibility that some women
who seek abortion are specifically, responsibly, and reasonably seeking to
terminate the life of the potential child. 1 1 5

Indeed, women who fear that

nobody will want their children may prefer abortion to non-fatal pregnancy
termination.

A woman who knows her genetically related or gestational

child will be placed in an artificial womb, foster home, or adoptive family
may feel compelled to reject a mode of pregnancy termination that nonethe
less results in biological parenthood.

Women who carry fetuses that, be

cause of their illness, handicap, or race, are unlikely to be well cared for by
others might elect to parent rather than turn their children over to the state
or private charities to become society's refuse.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the sake of women's rights and the Constitution, Tribe searches for
compromise. Tribe's extraordinary feminism is an appealing feature of his
search:

Mindful of history, he scrupulously avoids sacrificing women to

mythical ideals of morality or majoritarian justice. Tribe believes that a pub
lic commitment to safe, effective contraception and to childcare programs
would serve the ends of compromise by reducing the need for abortion.
And, although he agrees that the jurisprudence of

Roe

is imperfect, Tribe

insists that the Supreme Court should preserve the constitutional protection

Roe

affords women.

The Supreme Court will soon have another opportunity to overturn
v.

Wade.

Roe

The stage is set, for there are new faces on the bench and a series of

precedents in place that criticize or ignore

Roe.

The Court is likely to seize

its opportunity, and abortion policymaking will return substantially to the
states.

Some states, of which Florida and Connecticut are examples, have

constitutional and statutory abortion protections already securely in place.
But these protections are not permanently immune from politics, and in
every state a bonfire of controversy potentially rages. Many states will enact
and enforce statutes that leave women without equal protection or a mean
ingful set of private reproductive choices. Congress has already considered a
pro-choice Freedom of Choice Act. However, under the current administra
tion, a national pro-choice abortion rights statute is unlikely to survive.
The upshot of Tribe's book may not be the optimistic message he
tended.

The Court is poised to abandon

Roe.

in

If Tribe is correct, the

Supreme Court ' s abandoning the right to choose would be a grand moral,
1 1 4. p 225.
1 1 5 . See Ross, supra note 3 (arguing that the death of the fet l!S may be a reasonable and
responsible

preference).
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political, and constitutional error. At a minimum, the Court's abandoning

Roe

would make it that much harder for other institutions to mediate the

clash of absolutes. I t appears that the political burden of championing lib
eral abortion rights-which Tribe declares no woman should have to shoul
der-will soon enough weigh heavily again on those who favor them.

